This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal …rms'reaction to the consumers'behavior, even if …rms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that …rms'competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ine¢ cient time-varying cost shocks faced by the …rms, e.g. the ones regarding to inef-…cient equilibrium output levels under ‡exible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive …rms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and "attract more customers". and mirta@uiuc.edu 1 Blinder et al. (1998) …ndings, inferred from a sample of 200 …rms in United States, suggest that the median price adjustment frequency are 1.4 times per year, meaning that prices remain stick for almost 9 months, on average. And about 50% of …rms adjust their prices once a year, at most. In a similar work, run by the Bank of England, Hall et al. (1997) infer that more than 60% of the surveyed …rms, on a sample of 654 United Kingdom …rms, adjusted their prices once or twice during the studied year. These results are consistent with the ones found by Blinder et al., even though coming from a di¤erent country. In the same line, Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2005) focused at two internet-leader bookstore (Amazon and Barnes & Noble), on a sample of 3124 books. Regardless the fact that those …rms have no physical adjusting costs, the authors found out that prices change only 2.4 times a year, on average.
Introduction
This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal …rms'reaction to the consumers behavior, even if …rms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that …rms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy in order to attract more customers. The intuition behind the model formal conclusions are explained as follows.
We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets that also compete with each other. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ine¢ cient time-varying cost shocks faced by the …rms, e.g. the ones regarding to ine¢ cient equilibrium output levels under ‡exible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Indeed in a real world economy with several consumption centers as supermarkets or shopping malls, for instance, high frequent decisions on which one to choose are made before knowing the actual prices. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive …rms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize price uncertainty and "attract more customers". On the other hand, increasing such a degree reduces the unconditional expected discounted ‡ow of …rms'pro…t, so there is a trade o¤ between attracting more costumers and reducing pro…ts.
In such a context, we proof two theorems stating that: (a) there is no equilibrium in which households always choose the same consumption center; and (b) the equilibrium degree of price stickiness is the highest, provided that …rms have non-negative unconditional expected discounted pro…t ‡ows, e.g. the unconditional expected discounted pro…t ‡ows will be zero in non-trivial cases. Such a result follows from the two types of competition inputted in the model. The …rst one is the traditional monopolistic competition that allows each …rm to choose an optimal price that maximizes its expected discounted pro…t ‡ow. The second one is the Bertrand ‡avor competition played by the consumption centers using the degree of price stickiness in order to be more "attractive" for the households.
Background literature
Considerable empirical evidence suggests that prices are sticky in the short run. Some pricing behavior studies, carried out among representative …rm samples, indicate that several prices remain …xed on average for more than one quarter 1 . This price setting behavior suggests that prices do not change as frequently as the observed alterations in the state of the economy, which occur more often.
Those facts motivated the development of a broad theoretical research agenda about price stickiness modeling. In order to …lter the spectrum of possible theories concerning price stickiness, indicating correct ways to be followed by future researches, Blinder et al. (1998) surveyed the reasons why …rms do not adopt ‡exible prices among a signi…cative sample of 200 …rms in the United States, from several industries. They asked business people about their pricesetting practices and their opinions about which academic theories, expressed in laymen's terms, matched the actual price-setting procedures in United States 2 .
It is interesting to note that, although it was never asked whether their costumers were averse to price variation, most of the surveyed …rms voluntarily mentioned that changing prices would "antagonize" or "cause di¢ culties" with their customers, and such a fact would be a strong reason why …rms fear to adjust their prices. Indeed, the authors stressed that this issue "came up so often that …guring out precisely what it means should be a high-priority item on any future research agenda." Surprisingly, Hall et al. (1997) also stressed that fact that their surveyed …rms "stated that physical menu costs of changing prices were a less important source of price rigidity than the need to preserve customer relationships". And at the same direction, Zbaracki et al. (2004) stated: "Changes in prices harmed the customer perceptions of the …rm's reputation, integrity, and reliability."
Nowadays the mainstream in price stickiness macroeconomic modeling, whose main reference relays in Woodford (2003) , incorporate adjusting costs, strategic complementarities measures and the presence of di¤erentiated goods, on a monopolistic competition environment. Taking the real business cycle (RBC) analysis structure 3 , those models focus on the agents optimization problems with intertemporal budget constrains and are so general that the neoclassical or new-Keynesian features are just a result of a particular relationship assumed between the basic preference and technology parameters. Those parameters de…ne the degree of price setting strategic complementarity, among the suppliers of di¤erent goods, whose magnitude de…nes how sticky prices are.
Moreover, the majority of the existing analysis on price stickiness directly assumes a Calvo's (1983) type source of nominal rigidity or its extensions 4 . Brie ‡y speaking, the simplest model state in ad hoc way that …rms maintain unchanged their prices for two consecutive periods probability , independently on the other …rms' behavior. Such a modelling approach has been often used in monetary policy analysis for allowing a straightforward derivation of the central bank's loss function, as a second order approach of the welfare function, besides a good empirical adherence as well as an easy analytical treatment. As a matter of fact, Calvo's type models may be interpreted as stylized simpli…cations of the more plausible state dependent adjustment cost models 5 , generating similar results with less analytical e¤ort.
In spite of such appealing features, Calvo's type models have been subjected to some criticism due to the fact that the stochastic process is imposed into the model economy in a rather ad hoc way. Furthermore if …rms have no adjustment costs, a Calvo's type economy with timeinvariant ine¢ cient shocks is not e¢ cient, for under usual assumptions the adoption of ‡exible prices will be the optimal choice from both the …rms and consumers point of view. Therefore, there are no reason why …rms would rationally submit themselves to a Calvo's lottery. The case of time-varying ine¢ cient shocks is still inconclusive, depending on whether consumers prefer a ‡exible price environment or not. Rotemberg (2002) , on the other hand, presented a model in which the probability of not adjusting the prices for two periods is determined on an endogenous way. If consumers'utility functions have a psychological component, regarding the expected degree of …rms' altruism, they strongly react to unfair price increases. Hence if consumers have imperfect information about the actual costs, …rms will be unwilling to adjust prices so frequently due to the possibility of being interpreted as an unfair pricing setter by the consumers. The key point of this study is to regard the consumers' behavior as the source of price stickiness, as being suggested by Blinder et al. (1998) . However, his results apply only to unfair price increases, so consumers' aversion to price variations still remains to be carefully understood and analytically treated.
The paper approach
Within this framework, the present study aims to build a model of pricing behavior in which the degree of the price rigidity is strategically chosen by pro…t maximizing …rms, as an optimal decision to face consumer's risk aversion. Thus, the probability of not adjusting prices is endogenously determined. Moreover, some of the assumptions adopted in the basic Calvo's type model considered in Woodford (2003) are relaxed, allowing for the presence of several (unit mass) complete markets in the model economy. These markets are herein called consumption centers. We state that households do not assess the information about the actual state of the economy, in terms of the real …rms'costs and prices, prior to each period consumption center choice. Once such a choice is made the actual state of the economy is revealed but consumers optimal shopping decisions are restricted to the elected consumption center 6 . In each of the following periods, new choices on consumption center are made in similar conditions. In equilibrium, it will be shown that …rms adopt a randomization strategy to decide when to adjust prices. Such an equilibrium will be found with traditional assumptions about consumers' preferences. As presented further on, price stickiness will be a consequence of the broadly accept assumption of consumers risk aversion, formalizing the research lacuna mentioned by Blinder et al. (1998) . In such an environment, the price uncertainty of a ‡exible price economy decreases the consumers'expected discounted utility ‡ow, so competitive …rms adopt a price stickiness strategy as a best response in order to attract more clients. On the other hand, increasing price stickiness reduces the present value of …rms expected pro…t ‡ow. So equilibrium implies that …rms increase the price nominal rigidity until the point in which the present value of …rms expected pro…t ‡ow is zero 7 . Consequently, our results represent a plausible solution to the unsolved problem of the case of …rms facing time-varying ine¢ cient cost shocks. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the necessary modeling extensions to the Woodford's (2003) basic model, formally deriving the main result of this study, namely the implicitly de…ned degree of price stickiness in the model economy. Moreover, this section also presents original contributions to the theoretical analysis nominal rigidity sources. Section 3 presents Taylor approximations to the structural results derived in section 2 and introduces some related conclusions. Simulations on the endogenous degree of price stickiness and the volatility of the aggregate variables are also shown in this section. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
The Model
In this section, we introduce an extension to Calvo's type basic model. But now competitive …rms strategically choose the degree of price stickiness, which in equilibrium depends on the economy deep parameters, namely the consumers' risk aversion and the ones related to the production function and the stochastic cost shocks distribution.
Furthermore, it depends on the way monetary policy is conducted. Thus, the Lucas's critique applies in this latter sense. But a similar critique also comes up. Adapting Woodford (2003) words: since price stickiness depends on the exogenous cost shock distribution, traditional monetary evaluation exercises using macroeconometric models are ‡awed by a failure to recognize that the relations typically estimated, even with quasi-structural equations containing future expectations derived with an ad hoc imposed nominal rigidity source, are reduced-form rather than truly structural relations, for structural changes in the stochastic cost shocks generating process may change the optimal degree of price stickiness chosen by the …rms.
As in standard recent literature (see Woodford (2003) for more details), we model a cashless economy, in which there is a monetary unit of account in terms of which prices are quoted. This unit of account is de…ned in terms of a claim to a certain quantity of a liability of the central bank, which may or may not have any physical existence 8 .
Households
In real world, purchasing decisions of great part of goods, as durables, are su¢ ciently sparse to allow enough time to gather price information before purchases are actually concluded. Thus traditional assumptions stating that consumers know all the prices before consuming is quite a good description of reality. Such an economic decision is exhaustively modeled and its consequences are well understood.
But there are situations in which such a premise does not work so well. Consumers frequently face the following recurrent questions: which shopping mall should I choose? Or which supermarket? People's habitual behavior is to choose a supermarket before knowing the actual prices, only e¤ectively known when walking through its rows. And doing so, empirical evidence points that after choosing a place to buy, consumers restrict their purchasing decisions only to the goods found in the elected market.
Therefore, the following question arises: how to incorporate such a decision pattern in formal analytical models? And what are the consequent optimal agents decisions?
In an e¤ort to answer such a question, we assume the existence of several complete markets, or consumption centers (C j , henceforth), indexed by j. In each one, monopolist …rms i hire specialized labor force h j;t (i) at nominal wage w j;t (i) and produce di¤erentiated goods i. As usual, we assume that i 2 (0; 1) in a unit mass continuum and that individual …rm's decisions have no in ‡uence on wages. Each market is then characterized by monopolistic competition. We also assume that …rms are subjected to exogenous cost shocks, formalized further on, but none of them are subjected to price adjustment costs. 8 As analytically shown in Woodford (2003) , such an approach is justi…ed by two facts:
(a) In an economy in which the central bank uses a short-term nominal interest rate as their instrument, often empirically characterized by central bank reaction functions as Taylor type rules, the old theoretical models considering money growth targets are not convenient since it is not necessary to …rst determine the endogenous evolution of money supply in order to understand the consequences, in terms of product, in ‡ation and welfare, of such interest rate rules. Money, prices and interest rates are rather simultaneously determined given a central bank reaction function;
(b) In an economy in which households optimally choose to hold money balances in order to reduce transaction frictions, frequently modeled including real balances in the utility function or assuming cash-in-advance constraint, equilibrium relations are direct generalizations of those for the cashless economy. However, since its quantitative results are not too di¤erent if monetary frictions are parameterized in an empirically plausible way, a cashless analysis is a useful simpli…cation.
Here, we consider markets transacting non-durable goods, so that the purchase decisions happen with high frequency 9 . Given the great number of goods and given the decision frequency, it is not reasonable to consider that consumers are informed of all the prices prior to each period market choices. Not because of information cost, but due to the fact that the period length between consecutive consumption decisions is lower than the necessary to memorize make optimal decisions based on the huge information set 10 . Therefore, the above consideration leads us to assume that the consumers'buying decision is based on historical data on prices. In other words, we assume that the consumers know the historical average pricing strategy adopted by each …rm. In general, this information can be summarized by indexes such as price averages, price volatility and so on.
Even though it seems to be a strong assumption, it captures the observed consumers behavioral pattern previously exempli…ed. For illustrative purposes, we can take the traditional grocery shops as examples of our model's consumption centers. Each item 11 is su¢ ciently differentiated and they all are diversi…ed. Another example would be the set of large shopping malls, which gather several di¤erentiated …rms.
For simpli…cation purposes, we build a model in an environment with only two consumption centers 12 . Due to such considerations, we make the model's primary assumption:
Assumption 1 In every period, preceding the choice of a consumption center, only historical price patterns are households common knowledge. Hence, they choose a consumption center before they have the information about the prevailing prices of the chosen center. Once this choice is made, their consumption decisions are restricted to the chosen market.
Furthermore, it is important to make use of some tools from game theory, in particular some concepts and their rationale, for they explicitly handle the agents'rationality. Indeed, the microfounded macroeconomic rational expectations equilibrium concept have their peer in game theory sub-game perfect equilibrium concept, for embedding the same rationale of backward inductions methodological algorithm: rational expectations optimal decisions in period t are agents'best responses, given the best responses to be made in the future. Under certain assumptions, described in Woodford (2003) , we may use the concept of a representative household. In order to characterize its preferences, we de…ne u ( ) and ( ) denoting consumption utility and labor disutility respectively 13 . It is convenient to make some regularity assumptions:
The domains of u ( ) and ( ) are strictly positive 14 , in other words u; v : (0; +1) ! R. 9 Hence, the model is not proposed to explain the whole economy, but only speci…c sectors. 10 Even with computer assistance to …nd which …rms are cheaper, time would still be an issue, due to the length of time required by price researches to catalog and release price information. 11 Since the model assumes an in…nite number of agents, one may argue that the real world …nite number of agents may ‡aw the model results. Nevertheless, a known result of Debreu (1975) states that a Walras equilibrium convergence rate to the core, in regular economies, is of order O(1/n). Since Walras equilibria have a …nite number of agents in spite of the in…nite number of agents of the core, one may conjecture that the problem concerning the number agents may be minimized at least as fast as the actual number of agents. 12 However, the analytical treatment and results can be easily expanded for the case of several consumption centers. 13 Note that they are not subject to preference shocks, as in traditional literature. Also, we assume further on the absence of technology shocks in the production function. Such assumptions aim only to simplify the analysis allowing us to better understand the consequences of ine¢ cient time-varying exogenous shocks hitting …rms'marginal costs, formally introduced in subsection 2.2. And due to this last disturbance source, the model distinguishes the concepts of natural and steady state products, formally de…ned in subsection 2.2.1.
14 Economic modeling usually assumes that equilibrium consumption and labor force are not zero. Therefore, such an assumption does not restrict the model results.
Assumption 3
The function consumption utility u ( ) is increasing in consumption, strictly concave, and its third derivative satis…es u CCC ( ) > 0 in its domain. Furthermore, the function labor disutility ( ) is increasing in labor and strictly convex in its domain.
According to Assumption 1, consumption decisions are restricted to the chosen C j . Therefore, we may aggregate consumption in such a consumption center considering the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) standard way, which assumes a constant elasticity of substitution > 1 among the di¤erentiated transitioned goods, as shown in equation (1) below, where c j;t (i) indicates the consumption of good i from C j , in period t.
In each period t, after choosing a particular C j , households gets the instantaneous consumption utility u (C j;t ), e.g. no matter how C j;t is distributed among each good i from C j , only the aggregate consumption in the consumption center is important in terms of preference issues 15 .
One can easily derive 16 the hicksian demand function of good i from C j and an expression for the aggregate price P j;t in each consumption center, as shown in (2) and (3), below.
In order to capture either deterministic or stochastic (randomizations) choices among each consumption center, de…ne as the probability of choosing the C 1 . This modeling procedure allows, in turn, to capture deterministic choices by = 0 or = 1, as the events in which the household always chooses C 1 or C 2 , respectively. Moreover, this probabilistic treatment allows for possible randomizations, without the need of modifying the corresponding expressions.
As a consequence of Assumption 1, the choice of the consumption center can be interpreted as a choice among lotteries, with the corresponding pay o¤'s depending on the prevailing prices found at the chosen center. Hence, the aggregate consumption C t from both consumption centers must satisfy the equality (4), e.g. C t is the equivalent consumption, under absence of uncertainty on the lottery choice, which generates the same utility level as the one measured by the expected utility. However, C t is not a certainty equivalent aggregate consumption, for it is still a random variable due either to the uncertainty regarding the prices found in each consumption center and to the other random variables present in the model economy.
For simpli…cation sake, we assume as well that the representative household supply labor only at the chosen consumption center C j . Thus we aggregate the labor force h j;t (i) supplied in each C j to produce good i by the same way we did with the aggregate consumption, for there are similar uncertainties as the previous considered ones. Therefore we aggregate the amount of labor force as indicated below in equation (5) . 15 Such an assumption is very in line with the one adopted in recent literature. 16 Similar results are standard in recent literature, so the analytical derivation is not shown here.
We may now de…ne P t and w t (i) denoting the aggregate price and the aggregate wage of labor force of type i among all consumption centers in period t, respectively, satisfying the following relations:
As standard, we assume that …nancial assets are evenly shared among all households in period zero, so complete markets imply in identical budget restrictions for every household. Moreover, de…ne W t as the nominal …nancial wealth held by the household in the beginning of period t, Q t;t+1 as the stochastic discounting factor that must exist under absence of arbitrage, as the preference intertemporal discounting factor, i t is the nominal interest rate satisfying
and t (i) as the nominal pro…t from selling each good i. Also de…ne Q t; = Q s=t+1 Q s 1;s . Regarding the representative household, note that after choosing a C j in each period t, the prevailing prices of the chosen center are known. However, expectations regarding future consumption and prices are summarized by C and P , for 8 > t, for the future choices on consumption centers are still lottery choices. Hence, the household problem can be formally represented by (8) and its solution depends on the non-ponzi constraint (9) .
Denote by Y j;t and Y t aggregate production levels to be further discussed. Considering that all production must be consumed in equilibrium for every period, e.g. C j;t = Y j;t and C t = Y t , it is straightforward to solve the problem (8) and obtain the standard shaped Euler equations (10) and (11) .
Note that in period t 1, the following equation would hold as a consequence of (11).
Purging equations (10) and (12), we present the new generalized Euler equation (13) associated to our consumption center economy:
Where
The last results lead us to an interesting interpretation. Even after the choice of a consumption center, the expectations about future aggregate consumption and prices do not change and are the same as the ones prevailing just before that choice. Furthermore the rationale of optimal current consumption planning, as a function of current aggregate price, remain unchanged even after the choice of a center.
Considering the rationale of backward induction, since households actually know they will optimally behave in period t + 1, optimal decisions in period t are made assuming that the expectation term at the right hand side of (13) is given. It means that such a term do not depend on contemporaneous decisions 17 . Therefore, we state the following remark:
The expectation term at the right hand side of the previously depicted consumption generalized Euler equation is not a function of contemporaneous decisions.
Another important …rst order condition that solves the problem (8) is the expression (15) for the real wage w t (i) =P t of type i.
Moreover, it is not di¢ cult to verify that the next relation must hold:
Firms
As usual in this type of modeling, we assume that each …rm is specialized in the production of a unique good i, holding monopoly of its production, in an environment of monopolistic competition. Furthermore, the only input of each …rm is the specialized labor force. In addition, some other simplifying assumptions are made 18 .
Assumption 4 Firm are price takers, regarding the nominal wage w t (i), in the labor market.
Assumption 5 Even though there is a committed price in each period, if there is no demand for a good i, the …rm i will make no expenses.
We assume a "just in time" process of inputs supplying, so that the elapsed time between producing and supplying is negligible. Therefore, …rms do not need to anticipate the production decision, e.g. y j;t (i) = c j;t (i), 8j 2 f1; 2g and 8t 0.
Assumption 6 There is a stochastic process, de…ned further on, that hits on the Firm's cost functions.
Assumption 7 There is a steady state 19 level for prices 20 , namely P . However, the distribution of the stochastic process generating the exogenous shocks can vary.
Thus, if such a shock term follows an autoregressive process it is possible that prices remain above, or below, its stationary level for an arbitrarily long length of time, allowing for persistent in ‡ation. However, the assumption on P implies that in ‡ationary periods will be followed by de ‡ationary ones.
Assumption 8
The unconditional distribution of all the random variables considered in this model economy is time stationary.
Before presenting our equilibrium analysis, we formally characterize the outcomes of three types of possible environments: (a) the standard ‡exible price environment, for the outcomes under most price equilibria are better understood when compared with the former; (b) the e¢ cient producing and the steady state producing environments; and (c) the standard sticky price environment. In the latter environment, we show some useful results in order to conduct our equilibrium analysis. In particular, we show that the unconditionally expected pro…ts of competing …rms under a standard sticky price environment decreases with the degree of price rigidity.
Flexible prices
Let Cost j;t (i) be the total cost of …rm i from C j in the period t. Since the produced good is differentiated, and given the assumption that the household cannot change between consumption centers until the next period once one of them is chosen, the …rm i is subject to monopolistic competition.
Let then j be the consumer's probability of choosing C j , e.g. 1 = and 2 = 1 . With such a notation, we formalize the problem of the …rm i from C j as to maximize its expected pro…t of each period subject to the demand curve (2), e.g.
Optimal solution implies that p j;t (i) is determined with a markup over the nominal marginal cost S " j;t (i), as expected due to the monopolistic competition environment, e.g.
Where S " j;t (i) = @Cost j;t (i) @y j;t (i) and = 1 > 1. We assume that each …rm i from C j have that same production function as shown in (19) , so that its only input is the labor force h j;t (i).
Where the parameter A denotes the average production technology used by …rms from all consumption centers, and f ( ) satis…es the following assumptions:
The domain of f ( ) is strictly positive.
Assumption 10 The function f ( ) is strictly increasing in labor force and strictly concave.
We assume that each …rm faces a total cost function represented in (20) below.
Where " t is a time-varying exogenous shock such that:
Where " t are i:i:d: for all t with E ( " t ) = 0. We de…ne s " j;t (i) and s j;t (i) as the real marginal cost and the real labor marginal cost, respectively, e.g. s "
. Since …rms are price takers in labor market, we may derive the following expression for s j;t (i) considering the equations for real wages (15) and for the production function (19):
Where (y) = @f 1 (y) @y . Note that we may represent the real marginal cost s " j;t (i) as follows:
Now, given the demand equation (2), we may rewrite (18) as follows:
E¢ cient and steady state productions
Consider now the e¢ cient output level Y e that maximizes the representative household's instantaneous utility
i in a given period t. It is easy to conclude that the …rst order condition satis…es the following equation. Due to the absence of any time-varying term, the e¢ cient production shall be time-invariant.
Note that the left hand side of the previous result is an equivalent representation of the real labor marginal cost s j;t (i) evaluated in the e¢ cient level of production. Therefore, we state the following de…nition.
De…nition 2
The (time-invariant) e¢ cient product Y e , the equilibrium aggregate production level that maximizes the representative household's instantaneous utility, is implicitly de…ned by relation (26) .
Comparing equations (25) and (26), we conclude that Y n t equals Y e only if ( 1 " t ) = 1, e.g. in an event of measure zero for practical purposes. Thus, it is expected the natural product to be ine¢ cient in general 21 .
Regarding the steady state production level, one easily shows that it must satisfy the following de…nition:
The steady state product Y , the equilibrium aggregate production level prevailing in all consumption centers if the shock term " t remains …xed in its mean " in all periods, is implicitly de…ned by relation (27) .
Since (27) may be rewritten as s Y ; Y = ( 1 "), the e¢ ciency of the steady state product depends on the value of the parameter ". As the standard literature, we assess its ine¢ ciency degree considering the parameter y 1, implicitly de…ned as follows, so that the steady state product is e¢ cient if and only if y = 0.
Considering our model features, the ine¢ ciency degree parameter y may be de…ned as in (28) below.
Note that our model has possibly two sources of ine¢ ciency: (a) the monopolistic power of …rms, captured by the price markup ; and (b) the cost shock, captured by its average ". Therefore, in order to correct the ine¢ ciency sources and make Y e¢ cient the model economy needs a time-varying subsidy, for y = 0 if and only if " ef = 1 < 0, e.g. the cost shock must actually be a subsidy averaging the inverse of the elasticity of substitution among the di¤erentiated goods.
Sticky prices
Consider the standard assumption in which a particular …rm adjusts its price in period t with the timeless probability (1 ), within the staggered pricesetting framework of Calvo's (1983) nominal rigidity structure. Denote by p j;t (i) the new price if the …rm adjusts in period t. Thus the probability of not readjusting is the …rm's measure of price stickiness. Note that the situation in which the …rm always chooses ‡exible prices is modeled by = 0.
Therefore, considering that some properties of uniform convergence apply, the …rm's expected sum of pro…t ‡ow 22 d j;0 (i) discounted at period t = 0 may be represented as in
Due to its monopolistic power, the pro…t-maximizing …rm i must choose an optimal price sequence p j;t (i) 1 t=0 that maximize (29) given its demand equation (2) . Note that such a problem is separable into several independent simpler problems like (30), one for each branch on the possibility tree depicted in Figure 4 of Appendix A.1 regarding the event "the …rm adjust its price in period t, once for good".
Where (p j;t (i) ; P j;t ; Y j;t ; w j;t (i) ; " t ) represents j;t (i), according to its de…nition presented in (17) .
Optimal solution implies:
Where j;t;T (i) = ( p j;t (i) ; P j;T ; Y j;T ; w j;T (i) ; " T ) and:
Note that the optimal price p j;t (i) is a continuous function 23 of , e.g. p j;t (i) = p j;t ( ). Now we assess some properties of the …rm's pro…t ‡ow value-function j ( ), the pro…t ‡ow function discounted at period t = 0 evaluated at the optimal prices p j;t ( ) 1 t=0 . In the equilibrium analysis conducted in next section, we search for an equilibrium in which …rms optimally decide a timeless 24 price rigidity degree to be maintained in all periods, e.g. …rms decide on the stickiness degree before knowing the future realizations of random variables. Hence, such decisions must be based on unconditional expectations.
Note that the cost shock may lead to negative pro…ts in some periods. Therefore, we state the following assumption on the necessary condition of market existence, where E " j ( ) denotes the unconditional expected value, in " , of j ( ).
Assumption 11 If the …rm i from C j is present in the market then there exists a non-zero probability measure for the households to choose this market, e.g. j > 0, and its unconditional expected pro…t ‡ow E " j ( ) is a continuous and non negative function of .
Moreover, one easily conjectures that a particular …rm maximizes j ( ) when choosing a ‡exible price strategy, e.g. = 0, for its expected pro…t j j;t (i) is maximized period-to-period as previously shown in (17) . Thus E " j ( ) is also optimized when = 0. Since higher values of imply in stronger restrictions 25 to the …rm's optimization problem (30), one expects that E " j ( ) is a decreasing function of its argument. The following statement formalizes such a conjecture:
Proposition 1 Under a timeless perspective, if a particular …rm i is present in the market then its expected pro…t E " j ( ) is a decreasing function of the degree of nominal price rigidity summarized by the probability .
The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
We next assess the case in which the …rm adopts the probability of price stickiness, but when adjusting the …rm decides instead for the sub-optimal price 26 p j;t ( ), where . Such a case is relevant, for we consider it when testing best responses in the further discussed equilibrium analysis.
In such a context, we de…ne d j ( ; p ( )) as the pro…t ‡ow function of a …rm that readjusts with probability (1 ), discounted at period t = 0 and evaluated at the sub-optimal prices p j;t ( ) 1 t=0 , where . Formally, d j ( ; p ( )) satis…es:
Now, we make the following statement:
Proposition 2 Under a timeless perspective, suppose that the i-th …rm from C j is present in the market and adopts the probability of price stickiness, but when adjusting it decides instead for the sub-optimal price p j;t ( ), where . In such a context the unconditional expectance of d j ( ; p ( )), previously de…ned in (32), satis…es the following inequality: 25 Since prices remain …xed for about = (1 ) periods, on average, the restriction works almost as if higher values of "increased" the number of restrictions of the type "p j;t (i) = p j;t 1 (i)". 26 Note that p j;t ( ) would be the optimal price if the …rm adjusted with probability (1 ) instead.
The proof is given in Appendix A.3. Therefore, a pro…t-maximizing …rm that optimally readjust its price with probability (1 ) have its expected pro…t decreased when increasing its price stickiness degree to even when readjusted prices are p j;t ( ) 1 t=0 instead of p j;t ( ) 1 t=0 . We next search for a particular equilibrium in which all …rms of a particular consumption center endogenously choose the same time-invariant price stickiness degree. Such an equilibrium is interesting for the standard literature assumes that all …rms are identical regarding their exogenously given nominal price rigidity degree, even if no adjusting costs apply. Our approach leads to an endogenous price stickiness degree as an optimal strategy of competing …rms. We stress the fact that such a result follows from the traditionally assumed consumer risk aversion, so it applies even in an economy where …rms have no adjusting costs.
The equilibrium
In line with the former assumption on distributions stationarity, we focus our analysis in searching for equilibrium outcomes in which agents'decisions are also time stationary regarding the …rms'choices on the degree of price stickiness. Although there should be other equilibria with idiosyncratic time-varying parameter j;t (i), our choice for such a speci…c equilibrium simpli…es our analysis while still allowing for a broadening of the understanding of the sources of nominal rigidities. Moreover, such an equilibrium is in line with the basic standard approach in which the degree of nominal rigidity is time-invariant.
In order to simplify the argument, we may consider that a coalition is formed among all the …rms from each C j , so that they all decide to adopt the same degree j of price stickiness. Such coalition is formed for long-run reputation purposes, and its plausibility is only possible if there is a mechanism that penalizes each …rm that refuses to adopt the group strategy. Indeed, consider the case in which no penalizing mechanism is created. Since every …rm knows that its strategy has no in ‡uence over aggregate variables, they will choose the "free rider" ‡exible price strategy, for it maximizes their individual pro…ts. Thus the existence of such a coalition depends on the penalizing mechanism. However such a coalition strategy permits a competitive advantage over the strategies adopted by the …rms from the other consumption center, as will be shown further on. Therefore such a coalition assumption is not so strong. We abstract from issues concerning the coalition, such as the coalition central planner, and focus on its consequences.
Formalizing our arguments we de…ne the equilibrium we search for:
The equilibrium of the above model economy consists on a set of dynamic equations characterizing the agents optimal behavior and a set of endogenously determined probability measures, such as the timeless degrees of nominal rigidity j adopted by each C j , and also the timeless probabilities j of choosing 27 the C j , both consistent with the agents solutions to their inter-temporal maximization problem.
Note that the previous de…nition implies that all the …rms, from the same C j , that readjust prices in period t choose the same optimal price p t ( j ). Note that the optimal price ultimately depends only on the chosen price stickiness degree, so if both consumption centers choose 1 = 2 = , every …rm that optimize in period t choose the same optimal price p t ( ), regardless the consumption center they belong to. However, if the consumption centers adopt di¤erent degrees of price stickiness, e.g. in case of 1 6 = 2 , the readjusted prices will di¤er from center to center.
Thus the aggregate price P j;t of each C j , de…ned in (3), may now be represented by the following expression.
An interesting feature of our modelling assumptions is that once chosen the consumption center, everything tends to mimic the standard models in the literature, at least until the following period.
Before presenting the next proposition, which states that the representative household's instantaneous utility function 28 is concave in prices, we need some lemmas 29 regarding the following functions:
Where k > 0 and K > 0.
Lemma 1
The previously de…ned function Þ u ( ) is strictly concave.
Lemma 2 If the consumption utility function satis…es the following restriction 30 , e.g. if the households are su¢ ciently prudent and risk averse, then the previously de…ned function Þ ( ) is strictly convex.
At a …rst glance the restriction (37) seems to be very strong. However in the case of the widely used Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions 31 , the parameters locus satisfying such a restriction is quite wide. Note that the narrow gray area of Figure 1 indicates the region where (37) is not satis…ed.
It is important to stress that such a restriction is just a necessary condition for the Lemma 2 to hold. The necessary and su¢ cient condition also includes labor disutility and production 28 Remember that the instantaneous utility function considers both the consumption utility and the labor disutility, e.g.
i . 29 Since their proofs are easy and purely algebraic, we omit them. 30 Its usual to consider the Absolute Prudence Index in economic analysis in which agents make optimal choices in an inter-temporal decision environment with uncertainties. A good reference is Kimball (1990) . 31 For CRRA utility functions as u (c) = c 1 1 1 1 1 , with a constant relative risk aversion index 1 , the absolute index of risk aversion and prudence are 1 a (c) = 1 =c and (c) = 1 + 1 =c, respectively. So, the inequality (37) can be simpli…ed to (2 1) 2 + (1 3 ) 1 + 1 > 0, whose solution set is: function parameters. Since its interpretation is less intuitive we did not present it. However such a new restriction narrows the gray area of Figure 1 , making even wider the acceptance area where Þ ( ) is strictly convex in the case of the CRRA utility functions. Now we are able to announce and prove an important proposition stating that a best response of the …rms from one consumption center is to increase the degree of price stickiness relative to the one adopted by the …rms from the other consumption center.
Proposition 3 Provided that restriction (37) is satis…ed and that E " 1 (0) > 0, suppose that the households always choose the C 1 , e.g. 1 = 1 and 2 = 0. Therefore, there is a small enough probability 2 > 0 such that if the …rms from C 2 announce the following price setting mechanism from a given period t onwards
then all households realize that they have better changing their strategies to 1 = 0 and 2 = 1, bene…ting the …rms from C 2 .
The proof is given in Appendix A.4. Based on the above arguments, we are able to formalize the characterization of the equilibrium concept from the households'behavior standpoint, as the next theorem assesses.
Theorem 1 Provided that restriction (37) is satis…ed and that E " j (0) > 0, there is no equilibrium in which the representative household always chooses the same consumption center 32 . Therefore, under such assumptions, households are indi¤erent between consumption centers in equilibrium.
The proof is given in Appendix A.5. Now, turning our attention to the …rms behavior, the next theorem assess that …rms choose the equilibrium degree of nominal rigidity eq as the highest degree of price stickiness consistent with a non-negative expected pro…t. Therefore such a theorem constitutes the key result of the present study.
Theorem 2 Provided that households are su¢ ciently prudent and risk averse, according to the inequality (37) of above Lemma 2 and that E " j (0) 0, equilibrium requires that all …rms from both consumption centers adopt the same highest degree of price stickiness 1 = 2 = eq , for which the expected pro…t is non-negative, e.g. E " j ( eq ) 0, 8j. Non-trivial solutions implies E " j ( eq ) = 0, 8j. Otherwise, if E " j (1) 0 then eq = 1 represents the trivial solution 33 .
The proof is given in Appendix A.6. Therefore, the above theorem implicitly de…nes the equilibrium stating that E " j ( eq ) = 0, 8j in the non-trivial case.
Note that it has a Bertrand equilibrium ‡avor. However, instead of competition on prices per se as in the Bertrand case, the equilibrium at hand considers a competition on the parameter capturing the degree of price rigidity.
It is interesting to note that such a result follows from the two types of competition inputted in the model. The …rst one is the traditional monopolistic competition that allows each …rm to choose an optimal price that maximizes its expected discounted pro…t ‡ow. The second one is the contribution of our modelling assumption on consumption centers. Indeed in the …rst decision moment of each period t, households must decide from two "identical goods", namely the homogeneous consumption centers. Therefore, a oligopoly game must apply to model competition among both consumption centers. Since such a competition is conducted in terms of the degree of price stickiness, the Bertrand game captured the strategic behavior. As a consequence, the expected discounted pro…t ‡ows turned to be zero in the non-trivial equilibrium, despite the fact they are the best …rms can make optimally choosing their individual prices.
In order to close this section three comments are in order. The …rst one concern the number of consumption centers in the model economy. In spite of adopting only two centers in the above economy, the obtained results can be easily extended to a larger number of consumption centers.
The second one refers to the fact that the above theorem generalizes the perfect competitive equilibrium result of zero pro…ts. Theorem 2 states that such a pro…t is zero on average or in expected terms.
The third one is based on Proposition 3. The uncertainty regarding the exogenous shock " t , which does not a¤ect the households' preferences neither the …rms' productivity, make households postpone the ‡exible prices environment.
Such a result is achieved from the fact that the expected utility decreases with the uncertainty regarding the ‡exible prices environment. We showed that a sticky price environment, at least a Calvo's type one, is preferred to the one with ‡exible prices. However it is important to point out that we did not proved that households prefer the Calvo's type nominal rigidity the most. It is possible that other price …ltering procedures may also reduce the implied uncertainty, but such a study does not belong to the scope of the present analysis.
Note that E " j ( eq ) depends on the distribution of (p t ( eq ) ; P j;t ; Y j;t ; w t (i) ; " t ), so the non-trivial equilibrium condition E " j ( eq ) = 0 implies that he endogenous degree of price stickiness eq depends on the distributions of aggregate price and production. But such distributions surely depend on the way monetary policy is conducted, for it determines the expected path of aggregate variables. Therefore the Lucas' critique may be applied, for changes on the way monetary policy is conducted may lead to changes in the endogenous degree of price stickiness and in the coe¢ cients of structural equations.
Moreover, we expect that the equilibrium price rigidity would depend on the distribution of the exogenous shock, so structural breaks in the stochastic process of " t a¤ect eq . Therefore, we could extend the concept behind the Lucas'critique. The dependency of the degree of price rigidity on the distribution of the exogenous cost shock strongly suggests that the traditional monetary policy evaluation exercises using macroeconometric models could be ‡awed. Typically estimated relations, even with quasi-structural equations, containing future expectations derived with an ad hoc imposed nominal rigidity source, are reduced-form rather than truly structural relations, for structural changes in the stochastic process generating the cost shocks can change the optimal degree of price stickiness chosen by the …rms.
Therefore, as a policy-oriented implication of the present study we recommend the utilization of econometric models with time-varying parameters in order to assess possible parameters structural breaks even if the implemented policy remains unchanged.
In the following section, we introduce the model's …rst and second order approximations for the corresponding structural equations. Among other results, we show that: (a) the degree of ine¢ ciency y constitutes a source of nominal price rigidity; and (b) the equilibrium (optimal) degree of price rigidity eq depends on the coe¢ cient of variation of the random shock " t , for a given monetary policy rule.
Log-approximated structural equations
Initially, it is convenient to derive log-approximations for aggregate product and prices through the consumption centers, adopting the following notation as the percentage deviation of each variable from its steady state value. For any variable { t , always positive or negative, with a steady state value {, we de…ne{ t log ({ t = {).
It is easy to verify that the expressions (4) and (6) imply the following …rst order Taylor approximations:
Moreover, from (24) and (26), we log-linearize the natural and the e¢ cient 34 products as follows:
Where y is the previously de…ned ine¢ ciency degree parameter and denotes the timeinvariant probability of choosing the C 1 , e.g. = 1 .
Assuming that the distribution support of " t is completely inside R + or R , we obtain the following log-linearizations for the real marginal cost: In turn, we may relate the aggregate real marginal cost to the output gap
Finally, the time-varying markup can be log-linearized as shown below. Note that b t is proportional to b Y n t , but oscillates in opposite directions.
The structural aggregate supply curve
Log-linearizing the …rst order condition (31) from the …rms'problem under price stickiness, we obtain the following New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC):
The term is well known in the literature and is related to the degree of strategic complementarity between …rms'price setting decisions. If is low enough, the aggregate price tends to be more sticky even when a great fraction of …rms adjust their prices more often.
Note now that the friction captured by the ine¢ ciency degree also a¤ects the nominal price rigidity through the parameter y . Indeed, such a parameter increases with the degree of e¢ ciency 1 y . Hence we argue that, in our set up, such a friction works also as a source for price rigidity.
Welfare and cost push shocks
Under certain conditions 35 it can be shown that in order to maximize the welfare of the representative household the monetary authority should minimize 36 :
Where the parameters > 0 and 0 are based on the deep parameters of the economy. More speci…cally , where is the coe¢ cient associated with output in the NKPC and represents the elasticity of substitution between goods in the economy.
Note that the monetary authority must also concern about dispersions of the aggregate production from its e¢ cient level rather than from the steady state level, e.g. e
x t Ŷ t is the relevant concept of output gap for monetary policy issues.
Thus we may rewrite the NKPC in terms of e x t rather than x t as follows, implying a cost push shock term related to the exogenous cost shock term b " t :
x t + E t t+1 + u t (48) 35 In particular, such an approximation is possible if the steady state product gets close to the e¢ cient product faster than the ine¢ ciency degree gets close to zero. Since such an approximation is always valid in the case of y = 0, several researches assume a government subsidy amounting the necessary value to o¤set the remaining ine¢ ciency sources in their model. 36 For an extensive explanation on deriving microfounded welfare based central bank loss functions, see Woodford (2003), chapter 6. Basically, it is a second order Taylor approximation of the welfare function around an e¢ cient steady state. Its functional form is crucially in ‡uenced by the assumed source of price stickiness.
Thus the unconditional expectance of u t satis…es
The endogenous degree of price stickiness
We obtain a log-linearized expression for the unconditional expected pro…t ‡ow E " j ( ) as follows:
h is an additional parameter that represents the steady state concavity of …rms'production function. So, the assumed regularity properties 37 about the function f ( ) implies that 1 f > 0. Therefore, as a consequence of log-linearizing the necessary condition of a non-trivial equilibrium, e.g. E " j ( eq ) = 0, 8j, the following equality must hold:
Note that E " b Y t and E " b P t clearly depend on the degree of price stickiness, for it in ‡uences the equilibrium expected path of aggregate product and price, and on the way monetary policy is conducted. Since monetary policy conduction varies, there is no unique solution of eq determined by (50). So the Lucas'critique may be applied as previously commented.
In the general case, the unconditional expectations of the aggregate variables depend on the distribution of the exogenous shock " t , for this is the only exogenous random variable. Indeed we show further on that an optimal monetary policy under a timeless perspective imply that E " b Y t and E " b P t are functions of E " b " t . So we expect that the equilibrium price rigidity would depend on the distribution of the exogenous shock. In other words, structural breaks in the stochastic process governing the exogenous shock induce changes the (endogenous) degree of price stickiness chosen by the …rms.
Hence, we approximate the …rst 38 and second 39 moments of b " t :
Note that both the unconditional expectance and variance of b " t can be approximated as functions of the variation coe¢ cient of " t . For simplicity, let V " denote the variation coe¢ cient of " t , e.g. V " = V ar " "t " 2 . Note that, given the approximation of E " b " t , the unconditional expectance of the cost push shock u t , shown in (49), is not zero and depends on the volatility of " t . In our approach, E " u t = 0 only if the variation coe¢ cient of " t is zero. 37 See Assumptions 9 and 10. 38 Since the function log ( ) is concave, the negative signal was expected. 39 The approximation of V ar " b " t is also convenient, since it allows for a volatility analysis of each aggregated variable, as made further on.
Following the analytical analysis, we turn next to numerically simulate the e¤ects of a given monetary policy rule on the endogenous determination of the degree of price stickiness. To this end, a particular speci…cation for a monetary policy instance is chosen.
Simulations under a timeless perspective optimal monetary policy rule
For simulation purposes, we consider a particular solution 40 of the time consistent optimal monetary policy approaches shown in Woodford (2003) , chap. 7. Adapting for our model at hand, a particular possible solution satis…es the following expression:
Where u t is the cost push shock term in (48), and 1 and 2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
In order to simplify our analysis, we assume that the cost push shock term evolves according to an AR(1) process, as follows:
Where t is i.i.d. with zero mean. Therefore the expected realization of u t+j can be derived as described below.
Substituting this result back in (53), we derive a more simpli…ed expression for E " b P t below. Note that it does not depend on the persistence parameter u of the stochastic process describing the cost push shocks.
It is easy to verify that the particular monetary policy rule implies that
Thus, from the expression of the unconditional expectance of the cost push shock u t , shown in (49), we obtain the unconditional expectations on aggregate price and output (percentage deviations from their respective steady state values) as follows:
Since the microfounded endogenous parameter is de…ned as in the previously shown central bank loss function, we may simplify the expression for E " b P t as follows:
Nevertheless, it is also convenient to use the above result (55) due to the fact that some central banks chooses a discretionary value that penalizes the dispersion of b Y t from b Y e as shown in the central bank loss function.
Note that if the monetary authority considers the microfounded parameter , output, price and consequently …rms' pro…t expectations will not depend on the price rigidity parameter. Hence, provided a non negative expected pro…t, …rms will choose a total price stickiness, e.g. eq = 1. But such a decision implies that = 0. Since , the only equilibrium occurs with = 0. Thus, under such a timeless perspective optimal monetary policy rule, the central bank will not penalize the aggregate product volatility when choosing a welfare maximizing criterion. As a result, prices will be completely stabilized while the product dispersion will have its maximum volatility.
It is important to stress that such a strong conclusion relies: (a) on the Assumption 7 on the existence of a steady state price level P ; and (b) on the assumption on absence of any preference disturbing shocks. For instance, consider the traditional literature case, with just one complete market of unit mass, in which households are homogeneous regarding their preferences, which are subjected to common knowledge disturbing shocks. A traditional result states that the aggregate price is also a function of such shocks 41 . Although not formally proved in our analysis, we can make the conjecture that not …ltering the implicit volatility on optimal prices implied only by such preference shocks would increase the economy welfare, for there is no household uncertainty concerning this volatility source. As a result, …rms would not choose the maximum price stickiness and eq is likely to be lower. Again, it is a conjecture to be tested in future extensions.
Returning to our formal analysis, we assess now the usual practice adopted by central banks to consider a discretionary weight for the aggregate output gap into the loss function, namely . Therefore E " b P t depends on the price rigidity parameter , as indicated in (46) and (55), for is a function of . In such a general case, the parameter eq depends on the volatility of the exogenous shock E " b " t . Following, we show the expected discounted pro…ts ‡ow in the case of a discretionary weight .
Since Corollary 1 states that E " j (0) 0 must hold in order to …rms be present in the market then the following inequality must also hold 42 .
"
1
Therefore, provided the assumptions of Theorem 2, the non-trivial equilibrium condition E " j ( eq ) = 0, 8j, implies the following expression for the endogenous degree of nominal rigidity:
Where 41 See Woodford (2003) . 42 Since lim !0 (1= ) = 0, the result is straightforward.
Consider now the most likely case in which " 0, e.g. " t is actually a cost. Thus one can verify 43 that eq is a decreasing function of the variation coe¢ cient of " t , e.g V ". In other words, if positive cost shocks are expected to happen then prices will be more frequently adjusted in environments where the volatility of " t is high. Moreover, if V " = 0 then the expected discounted pro…t ‡ow is is non-negative and do not depend on eq . Furthermore, the equilibrium degree of price stickiness eq is a decreasing function of the discretionary value . Hence, if the central bank aversion to aggregate product volatility is lower than the aversion to in ‡ation volatility, as it is the case of many central banks, then the degree of price stickiness in the economy, as a sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy, must be high.
In order to numerically simulate the degree of price stickiness, we assume a positive " value and adopt a particular Cobb-Douglas type production function speci…cation:
Where n < 1.
With such assumptions, it is easy to verify that the steady state concavity of f ( ) and the elasticity of the real labor marginal cost for the …rms are 1 f = (1 n) and ! = (1 n) =n, respectively. Moreover, " must satisfy 0 < " < 1 .
Additionally, it is possible to verify that the previous restriction (59) is always satis…ed if 1 1 crit , where:
On the other hand, if 1 > 1 crit then the previous restriction requires that the volatility measure V " be lower than a critical value V " crit , where:
Note that V " crit is a strictly decreasing function of 1 and is such that its lower bound V " LB crit = lim 1 !1 V " crit is determined as follows:
Since our approximations hold for small enough volatility values, the constrain V " V " crit shall not be very restrictive.
Base on the above results, we simulate eq as a function of the volatility measure V ", and of the remaining parameters of the consumption centers economy. These computations generate the graphs 44 depicted in Figures 2 and 3 below. Then, we can graphically infer the following fundamental relations in our model economy, as a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome. 43 Such properties rely on E " j ( eq ) = 0, E " j (0) 0, 8j, 1 First of all, the parameter of price rigidity eq is a decreasing function of the volatility of exogenous shocks, as shown in Figure 2 below. Furthermore, the more risk averse are the consumers, the higher is the degree of price stickiness in the economy. 
Conclusions
The present study aims to contribute suggesting a possible way to …ll the research lacuna …rst stressed by Blinder et al. (1998) . To this end, a model economy is built in which …rms could choose prices according to the Calvo's approach. Nevertheless, the degree of price rigidity eq is endogenously determined as a sub-game perfect strategy pro…le adopted by the …rms as an optimum response to consumers'risk aversion in an economy in which …rms are not subject to adjustment costs. This main result is formalized in Theorem 2.
In other words, our main results imply that …rms monopolistically compete setting optimal prices a la Calvo, and choosing the degree of price stickiness in a Bertrand game ‡avor. In equilibrium, such a behavior leads to a zero expected pro…t ‡ow, generalizing the traditional result of zero per period pro…t. However, we need to stress that this particular result depends on the existence of ine¢ cient stochastic shocks.
The results also show that the Lucas'critique may apply. Moreover, a relevant extension of the Lucas'critique is presented on the analysis. Since the degree of price rigidity depends on the distribution of the stochastic process governing the cost shocks, traditional monetary evaluation exercises using macro-econometric models are ‡awed by a failure to recognize that the relations typically estimated, even with quasi-structural equations containing future expectations derived with an ad hoc imposed nominal rigidity source, are reduced-form relations rather than truly structural relations. This is due to the fact that structural changes in the stochastic process generating the cost shocks may change the optimal degree of price stickiness chosen by the …rms. Hence, as a policy oriented recommendation we may suggest the use of time-varying parameters econometric models for monetary policy purposes, for it is di¢ cult to accurately asses the occurrence of such structural breaks.
Furthermore, it is shown that the degree of ine¢ ciency captured by the parameter y also a¤ects the nominal price rigidity by means of the parameter y . Thus, this degree of ine¢ciency can also be accounted as a source of price stickiness. In short, our analysis shows that ine¢ ciency and uncertainty are both key sources of price rigidities in the economy.
Finally, our numerical simulations indicate that if the monetary authority chooses the microfounded parameter , which captures the penalty of aggregate output gap in the central bank's loss function, and conduct a time consistent optimal monetary policy rule, …rms will optimally choose a full price stickiness, e.g. eq = 1. In such an instance, the only equilibrium occurs with = 0. Thus, under such a timeless perspective optimal monetary policy rule, the central bank will not penalize the aggregate product volatility when choosing a welfare maximizing criterion. As a result, prices will be completely stabilized while the product dispersion will have its maximum volatility.
It is important to stress that such a strong conclusion relies: (a) on the Assumption 7 on the existence of a steady state price level P ; and (b) on the assumption on absence of any preference disturbing shocks.
On the other hand, if the central bank chooses a discretionary weight , under the assumption of positive " t cost shocks, then the frequency of (optimal) price adjustments will be an increasing function of the cost shock volatility. Furthermore, it is shown that the degree of price stickiness is a decreasing function of the discretionary weight .
Regarding possible extensions, the present analysis should also consider economies in which there are also preferences and production technology shocks, and e¢ cient shocks. In such a case, consumers would not like that the price volatility generated by such shocks were completely …ltered. So, the technique applied in this study must be adapted, mainly regarding the fact that preference shocks are consumers' common knowledge and not a source of uncertainty. Probably, the equilibrium degree of nominal price rigidity will be lower than the one derived in this exercise.
Another important extension should consider model economies in which there is a persistent level of in ‡ation that a¤ects the agents'optimal behavior. One can even extend the model for the case of an open small economy. In that case, the inclusion into the model economy of an import sector and exporter …rms strategically deciding how much to pass the exchange rate volatility through their prices should be key elements. 
t+1 Q 0;t (p j; 1 (i) ; P j;t ; Y j;t ; w j;t (i) ; " t ) + :
Proposition 1 Under a timeless perspective, if a particular …rm i is present in the market then its expected pro…t E " j ( ) is a decreasing function of the degree of nominal price rigidity summarized by the probability . Proof. Assuming uniform convergence and considering all regularity assumptions previously made, we obtain the result:
However, in order to determine the …rst derivative @ j ( ) =@ , it is easier to consider the envelope theorem applied on d j;0 (i), previously de…ned in (29). First of all, we determine @ d j;0 (i) =@ considering some properties of uniform convergence applied over in…nite series di¤erentiating:
T t Q 0;T ( p j;t (i) ; P j;T ; Y j;T ; w j;T (i) ; " T ) +
Applying the envelope theorem, we obtain:
T t Q 0;T p j;t ( ) ; P j;T ; Y j;T ; w j;T (i) ; " T +
T =t @ T t @ Q 0;T p j;t ( ) ; P j;T ; Y j;T ; w j;T (i) ; " T # Note that p j;0 ( ) = arg max E 0 1 P T =0 j T Q 0;T ( ; P j;T ; Y j;T ; w j;T (i) ; " T ), as a consequence of the …rm's problem (30) under sticky prices. Since p j; 1 (i) is likely to be di¤erent from p j;0 ( ), the following result is straightforward:
Before applying the unconditional expectance operator, we need the following results: (a) The timeless perspective implies that p j; 1 (i) = p j; ( ) for some > 0, e.g. p j; 1 (i) is the most recent optimal price adjusted before the initial period t = 0.
(b) aggregate variables are independent on individual …rms'decisions, e.g. P j;t independs on p j;t ( ) for instance.
(c) The last results combined with the Assumption 8 on stationary distributions imply the following equalities: E " p j;t ( ) ; P j;T ; Y j;T ; w j;T (i) ; " T = E " p j;t ( ) ; P j;t ; Y j;t ; w j;t (i) ; " t E " (p j; 1 (i) ; P j;T ; Y j;T ; w j;T (i) ; " T ) = E " p j;t ( ) ; P j;t ; Y j;t ; w j;t (i) ; " t We such results in mind, we once more apply some properties of uniform convergence and obtain:
It is easy to verify that the expression inside the brackets sum zero. Therefore we obtain the following …nal result when considering (67):
Therefore, the expected pro…t E " j ( ) is a decreasing function of the degree of nominal price stickiness .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 Under a timeless perspective, suppose that the i-th …rm from C j is present in the market and adopts the probability of price stickiness, but when adjusting it decides instead for the sub-optimal price p j;t ( ), where . In such a context the unconditional expectance of d j ( ; p ( )), previously de…ned in (32), satis…es the following inequality:
E " d j ( ; p ( )) E " j ( ) for Proof. Note that d j ( ; p ( )) equals d j;0 (i) when the latter, de…ned in (29), is evaluated in p j;t (i) = p j;t ( ), 8t 0.
Since p j;t ( ) 1 t=0 2 arg max d j;0 (i), its value-function j ( ) = d j ( ; p ( )) satis…es the following inequality:
Moreover, since , the Proposition 1 implies that E " j ( ) E " j ( ). Thus, applying the unconditional expectance operator in both sides of (68), the following inequality must hold:
E " d j ( ; p ( )) E " j ( ) for Therefore, a pro…t-maximizing …rm that optimally readjust its price with probability (1 ) have its expected pro…t decreased when increasing its price stickiness degree to even when readjusted prices are p j;t ( ) 1 t=0 instead of p j;t ( ) 1 t=0 .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 Provided that restriction (37) is satis…ed and that E " 1 (0) > 0, suppose that the households always choose the C 1 , e.g. 1 = 1 and 2 = 0. Therefore, there is a small enough probability 2 > 0 such that if the …rms from C 2 announce the following price setting mechanism from a given period t onwards p 2;t (i) = p t (0) , with probability (1 2 ) p 2;t 1 (i) , with probability 2 then all households realize that they have better changing their strategies to 1 = 0 and 2 = 1, bene…ting the …rms from C 2 . Proof. Since households always choose the C 1 , the best response of all …rms from such a consumption center is to adopt ‡exible prices in all periods, e.g. 1 = 0, for either E " 1 (0) > 0 and such a strategy maximizes its expected discounted pro…t ‡ow as a consequence of Proposition (1). Therefore, the aggregate price and product from C 1 satisfy the following relations:
From (13) we replicate the generalized Euler equation as follows:
Note that Assumption (3) on regularity conditions implies that u C ( ) is invertible, so we may obtain the instantaneous consumption utility for consuming only in center 1, e.g.
Moreover, from the production function (19) , and relations (70) and (71) we obtain the implied instantaneous labor disutility for consuming only in C 1 , as follows:
So far note that the …rms from C 2 make a zero pro…t, once their goods will not be demanded. Suppose now that …rms from C 2 decide to adopt the strategy (38) of readjusting to p t (0) with probability (1 2 ), where 2 > 0 is su¢ ciently close to zero. Hence in the event in which households change their strategy to 2 > 0, the …rms from C 2 would make pro…ts such that E " d 2 ( 2 ; p (0)) E " 2 (0) as predicted by Proposition 2. Note that if E " 1 (0) > 0 implies E " 2 (0) > 0 if 2 > 0. Moreover, since the regularity assumptions on preferences and production implies that E " d 2 ( 2 ; p (0)) is a continuos function in 2 , Proposition 2 implies that there is a neighborhood close to zero in which E " d 2 ( ; p (0)) is positive and strictly decreasing. Therefore, if 2 is in such a neighborhood then E " d 2 ( 2 ; p (0)) > 0 in the event in which households change their strategy to 2 > 0. Now we test if the adoption of the previous strategy would induce the households to change their strategy to 1 = 0 and 2 = 1. Adopting the previously described price setting strategy 45 , the aggregate price in C 2 can be represented as follows.
From now on, we evaluate the representative household's utility in case of opting to change the choice strategy to 1 = 0 and 2 = 1. Similarly to the determination of (71) and (72), we obtain the (potential) instantaneous utility and the implied labor disutility derived for consuming only in C 2 , respectively, as follows.
Considering Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we apply the Jensen's inequality twice and obtain the following results: 45 With such a strategy, the …rms from C 2 smooth the ‡exible prices adopted by the …rms from
Since each decision on consumption centers can be thought as a lottery decision, we must consider the expected utility to evaluate which consumption center is the most preferred one. Therefore we apply the unconditional expectance operator into the previous inequalities:
Remember that t independs on past aggregate variables 46 and that aggregate prices independ on individual …rm price setting, for each single …rm decision cannot a¤ect the aggregate variables. Hence, considering the Assumption 8 on stationary distributions, we obtain the following equalities:
Hence from (71) and noting that u (Y 2;t ) = u u 1 C ( t P 2;t ) , it is straightforward to proof that the instantaneous consuming expected utility obtained from consuming only in C 2 is strictly greater than the one obtained from consuming only in C 1 , as follows:
Note now that (h 2;t (i)) =
. Hence it is also straightforward to derive the following result:
Aggregating the previous expression over the support (0; 1) and considering the uniform convergence theorem, we derive the following inequality:
We now use the Assumption 8 on stationary distributions, the iterated expectation property and the C 2 price setting strategy de…ned in (38) to derive the following steps on the right hand side term of the previous expression:
Thus, considering the previous result on unconditional expectance equalities, we obtain:
Therefore, considering the result (72), it is straightforward to proof that the instantaneous implied labor expected disutility obtained from consuming only in C 2 is strictly lower than the one obtained from consuming only in C 1 , as follows:
The result (75) was not surprising since the price setting strategy adopted by the …rms from C 2 reduced the price volatility generated by the C 1 price setting strategy. However, assessing the implied labor expected disutility was not that trivial due to the wage channel. But, provided that households are su¢ ciently prudent and risk averse, according to the inequality (37), we could prove that the implied labor expected disutility obtained from consuming only in C 2 was strictly lower than the one obtained from consuming only in C 1 .
From (75) and (76), the following result is satis…ed in every period t:
Therefore, in each period t, the expected discounted utility ‡ow obtained from changing the household's strategy to always choosing C 2 (left hand side of the above inequality) is strictly greater than the one obtained from always choosing C 1 (right hand side of the above inequality). Hence all households realize that they have better changing their strategies to A.5 Proof of Theorem 1 Theorem 1 Provided that restriction (37) is satis…ed and that E " j (0) > 0, there is no equilibrium in which the representative household always chooses the same consumption center. Therefore, under such assumptions, households are indi¤erent between consumption centers in equilibrium. Proof. Suppose, by contradiction and without loss of generality, that the representative household always chooses the C 1 , e.g. 1 = 1 and 2 = 0. Therefore, all …rms from C 2 make zero pro…t since their goods have no demand.
However, provided the conditions of Theorem 1 above, if all …rms from C 2 adopt the price setting strategy de…ned in (38) for a small enough probability 2 > 0, households realize that they have better changing their strategies to 1 = 0 and 2 = 1, as implied by Proposition 3. As a consequence, all …rms from C 2 would make positive pro…ts. Therefore, adopting such a price setting strategy is a best response, in a context of sub-game perfect equilibria 47 , and so …rms have the incentives to adopt it.
Hence 1 = 1 and 2 = 0 is not an equilibrium strategy, for contradicting the statement of De…nition 4. Similarly, there is no equilibrium in which 1 = 0 and 2 = 1. Thus, households randomize choosing 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 2 (0; 1).
It is straightforward to conclude that households are indi¤erent between consumption centers in equilibrium, otherwise they would always choose the favorite one.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 2 Theorem 2 Provided that households are su¢ ciently prudent and risk averse, according to the inequality (37) of above Lemma 2 and that E " j (0) 0, equilibrium requires that all …rms from both consumption centers adopt the same highest degree of price stickiness 1 = 2 = eq , for which the expected pro…t is non-negative, e.g. E " j ( eq ) 0, 8j. Non-trivial solutions implies E " j ( eq ) = 0, 8j. Otherwise, if E " j (1) 0 then eq = 1 represents the trivial solution.
Proof. This theorem is proven for the non-trivial cases in which E " j (0) > 0 and E " j (1) < 0, 8j.
As predicted by Theorem 1, equilibrium requires that 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 2 (0; 1). Moreover, households are indi¤erent between consumption centers in equilibrium, e.g. E " U 1 = E " U 2 , where 48
Let 1 and 2 be the strategies adopted by …rms from C 1 and C 2 , respectively, who are present in the market in the sense of Assumption 11. Hence Corollary 1 implies that they make non-negative expected pro…ts for adopting such strategies, e.g.
E " 1 ( 1 ) 0 E " 2 ( 2 ) 0 47 Note that there is a Nash equilibrium in which the households always choose a speci…c consumption center and all …rms from both consumption centers always adopt ‡exible prices. Houever, such an equilibrium is not a subgame perfect equilibrium. 48 Note that Assumption 8 on stationary distributions implies that E " U 1 and E " U 2 independs on time.
Suppose, by contradiction and without loss of generality, that 1 > 2 in equilibrium. Thus Proposition 1 implies that E " 1 ( 1 ) E " 2 ( 2 ). From now on, we consider the non-trivial case where the expected pro…ts are strictly decreasing on the degree of nominal rigidity, e.g. E " 1 ( 1 ) < E " 2 ( 2 ).
Since E " U 1 = E " U 2 , if all …rms from C 1 adopted 1 = 2 < 1 then they would make a larger expected pro…t, for consumers would remain indi¤erent among the consumption centers 49 . Therefore, adopting 1 = 2 < 1 is a best response for …rms in C 1 . Thus, 1 > 2 is not an equilibrium outcome, for contradicting the statement of De…nition 4. Similarly, 1 < 2 cannot occur in equilibrium as well. Therefore, equilibrium requires that 1 = 2 = eq , and such a fact is a common knowledge to all …rms.
Suppose now, by contradiction, that E " 1 ( eq ) > 0. Consider the non-trivial case in which eq < 1. Therefore, using a similar reasoning made to proof Proposition 3 above, there is a probability > eq in a neighborhood of eq such that if the …rms from C 2 adopted instead the following price setting mechanism 50 p 2;t (i) = p t ( eq ) , with probability (1 ) p 2;t 1 (i) , with probability then all households would realize a best response of changing their strategies to 1 = 0 and 2 = 1.
Note that Proposition 2 implies that E " d 2 ( ; p ( eq )) E " 2 ( eq ) if the households did not change their choices on j . However, their best response would be to change them to 1 = 0 and 2 = 1, bene…ting the …rms from C 2 , for the …rms'expected pro…ts would increase to ( 2 ) 1 E " d 2 ( ; p ( eq )). Again, with a similar line of argument used to proof Proposition 3 one easily shows that if is su¢ ciently close to eq then ( 2 ) 1 E " d 2 ( ; p ( eq )) > E " 2 ( eq ), e.g. the …rms from C 2 realize that adopting the previous price setting strategy is a best response in the case of E " 1 ( eq ) > 0. Hence, E " j ( eq ) > 0 is not an equilibrium outcome for eq < 1.
In the case in which E " j ( eq ) = 0, …rms would have no incentive to decrease even more the degree of price stickiness, for such an action would make their expected pro…ts to be negative. Therefore equilibrium requires that E " j ( eq ) = 0, if eq < 1.
If E " j (1) 0, one easily veri…es that eq = 1.
